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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE GEORGE FISHER, JR. FAMILY
INTER VIVOS REVOCABLE TRUST;
LaRUE FISHER, individually;
LaRUE FISHER, Settlor and
Trustee of The George Fisher,
Jr. Family Inter Vivos
Revocable Trust Agreement; and
BRENT ELMER FISHER, Co-Trustee
of The George Fisher, Jr.
Family Inter Vivos Revocable
Trust Agreement,

Case No. 940577-CA
Priority Rule 29(b)(15)

Plaintiffs, Appellants
and Cross-Appellees,
vs.
MAX GEORGE FISHER and JOYCE
FISHER,
Defendants, Appellees
and Cross-Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This Brief is a reply to those portions of the Brief of
Appellees and Cross-Appellants, which are given in answer to
Appellants' original Brief.

It is also an answer to the cross-

appeal portions of Appellees' Brief and it is recognized that
Appellees have opportunity to reply to that portion. Therefore, we
shall designate the separate portions as REPLY BRIEF and RESPONSE
TO CROSS-APPEAL.
-1-

The Appellees have not clearly indicated in their Brief
which portions are in answer to Appellants' appeal and which
portions are directed to the cross-appeal.

With apologies to

Appellees, we shall therefore first attempt to analyze Appellees'
Brief by indicating which portions are in answer to Appellants'
original Brief and which portions are in support of the crossappeal. We shall do that by restating the issues from our original
Brief and then indicate which portions of the Brief of Appellees
appear to be responsive to our original appeal; and then we shall
indicate which portions of Appellees' Brief introduce new subjects
to which we shall respond but to which Appellees also are entitled
to reply.
I.

DID GEORGE FISHER, JR., NOW DECEASED, MAKE AN ORAL AGREEMENT
WITH APPELLEE MAX FISHER POSTPONING PAYMENTS DUE UNDER THE
ESCROW AGREEMENT?
It will be noted that this issue is limited to an oral

agreement "postponing payments due," which accords with issue #b as
stated in our Notice of Appeal "that annual payments start on
demand by the plaintiffs." (R. 295) In other words, Appellants do
not challenge the finding of an oral modification of the Escrow
Agreement but do challenge the portion which states that annual
payments are to start at the rate of $10,000 per year upon demand.
Appellees, on the other hand, challenge the very existence of a
valid oral modification agreement because of the statute of frauds.
Appellants raised the issue of the statute of frauds under issue #3
of our Brief at pages 18-20 and 36-39.

-2-

Appellants therefore submit that Appellees have made no
answer to this narrow issue: "Assuming that there was a valid oral
modification of the Escrow Agreement as to installment payments,
did it include the provision that when demand is made, annual
payments will commence?"

Since their Brief does not address this

issue, it will not be further addressed in this Brief, except to
take issue with one statement.

At pages 2-3 Appellees' Brief

states:
Plaintiffs' requested standard of review on this
case (non-deferential review) is unfounded. The
criminal case cited by Plaintiffs does not apply to
contractual intent or payment agreements such as
the one at bar, nor does it support Plaintiffs'
requested standard of review on this issue.
II.

WAS APPELLANT LARUE FISHER, WIFE OF DECEASED GEORGE FISHER,
JR., BOUND BY THE ACTIONS OF GEORGE FISHER, JR.?
This same narrow issue is involved in this point.

Even

if LaRue Fisher is somehow held bound by the actions of her
husband, the deceased George Fisher, Jr., that binding effect must
be limited to the things of which she was aware.

There is no

testimony that she was ever made aware of the possibility that her
husband had in mind any deferment of an entire schedule of annual
payments of $10,000 per year.

This issue also has not been

addressed specifically by the Appellees and will also be submitted
to the Court on the basis of Appellants' original Brief.
III. ASSUMING THAT AN ORAL AGREEMENT WAS MADE, IS IT VOID BECAUSE
OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS?
This point is comparable to issue #1 of Appellees' Brief.
Appellees take the position that the statute of frauds applies to
the entire theoretical oral modification of the agreement but make
-3-

the additional objection that the conversations between George and
Max Fisher were not sufficiently specific as to terms to constitute
a

meeting

of

the

minds

which

would

support

an

agreement.

Appellants therefore do not disagree with that contention of
Appellees, although our original Brief limited the application of
the statute of frauds to the question of whether the agreement
amounted to a postponement of the commencement of annual payments
until demand was made. We don't care whether this Court upholds an
oral modification, so long as it does not include merely commencement of a schedule of payments following demand.
IV.

WAS A PAYMENT FOR CATTLE SOLD IN 1979 PROPERLY ALLOWED BY THE
COURT AS A PAYMENT ON THE CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF PROPERTY?
This issue is addressed under Appellees Argument V-B at

page 40-41 of Appellees' Brief.
V.

This will be replied to.

WAS THE REMEDY OF FORFEITURE AS SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANTS
INEQUITABLE UNDER THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT?
This is answered by Appellees under their issue #IV,

which has the same number in their argument at pages 32-38. Reply
will be made on this issue.
VI.

SHOULD THE COURT HAVE ALLOWED APPELLANTS' ATTORNEY FEES?
Appellees

do

not

answer

this

issue

as

raised

by

Appellants. Without stating it as an issue, in the last paragraph
of their Argument, which should be VII, Appellees ask for their own
attorney's feesf which is, in effectf an objection to the awarding
of attorneys fees to Appellants.
a reply.
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This issue will be addressed as

The Appellees do raise issues which are clearly issues of
the cross-appeal, as we shall herein endeavor to indicate:
APPELLEES II: The Trial Court improperly refused to apply
the statute of limitations to the majority of yearly installment
payments under the Escrow Agreement when Plaintiffs failed to
pursue action within the six year period.
Also, APPELLEES III: The Trial Court improperly failed
to apply the equitable doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and laches in
this case when George Fisher told Defendant not to make the yearly
installment payments and Defendant acted in reliance upon these
representations for approximately 15 years without reprisal.
And APPELLEES V:

Plaintiffs have failed to properly

marshalled the evidence to show clear error on the factual issues
they wish to appeal.
And APPELLEES VI: In finding that the contract had been
modified, the Trial Court erred by concluding that interest
continued to accrue on the contract principle when all the evidence
indicated that continued accrual was never contemplated by the
parties, George Fisher did not expect interest to accrue and the
payments were waived by both George and LaRue Fisher.
REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
I.

DID GEORGE FISHER, JR., NOW DECEASED, MAKE AN ORAL AGREEMENT
WITH APPELLEE MAX FISHER POSTPONING PAYMENTS DUE UNDER THE
ESCROW AGREEMENT?
As indicated in our Preliminary Statement (P. 3), we have

no real quarrel with the statement of Defendants in Appellees'
-5-

Brief that they challenge the making of an oral modification on
grounds of the statute of frauds.
Trial

Court's

finding

that

The question is whether the

George

Fisher

and

Max

Fisher

contemplated the demand for payment would commence a duty to make
annual payments of $10,000 each and whether that issue required a
different standard of review than the clearly erroneous standard
requiring a marshalling of the evidence as to the existence of the
agreement in general (Appellants' Brief, Pp. 2-3). The decision of
the Trial judge was that
The parties never specifically addressed the issue
as to whether all payments would become due when
George requested payments to commence.
and then:
The court finds that the agreement between Max and
George to amend the contract did not contemplate
that all prior payments became due immediately upon
the request of the sellers. It was contemplated
and agreed that payments would be delayed and
commenced again when George requested them. (R.
257, LI. 15-20)
Since this is speculation as to what might have been in the minds
of the parties, we suggested that no deference should be given to
that decision of the Trial Court.
decision on the evidence.

This Court should make its own

If we were wrong, and if the evidence

should be marshalled, then we did marshal all of the evidence on
the subject in our original Brief (see Pp. 11-13).
The two cases cited by Appellees in their Brief do not
help.
Mountain

Fitzgerald
States

v.
Tel.

Carbide,
& Tel.

793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990), and
v.

Sohm,

755 P.2d 144, 158-59 (Utah

1988), both involve interpretation of written agreements as to
-6-

ambiguities. In our case the issue is whether unuttered statements
can form an agreement as a Finding of Fact or whether that is
speculation to be reviewed without deference. If this Court agrees
with us, it must substitute its own opinion on the evidence for
that of the Trial Court. If this Court agrees with the Appellees,
then we have marshalled all the evidence and the Court can review
that evidence and see whether the Trial Judge correctly assessed
what was in the minds of the parties, even though not addressed by
them.
II.

WAS APPELLANT LaRUE FISHER, WIFE OF DECEASED GEORGE FISHER,
JR., BOUND BY THE ACTIONS OF GEORGE FISHER, JR.?
As previously stated, there is no response from Appellees

on this point.

They contend that the statute of frauds prevents

the finding of any agreement modifying the original agreement. If
the Court finds against Appellees on that point, the argument of
Plaintiffs under Point II is still submitted as being valid and
LaRue Fisher is not bound.
III. ASSUMING THAT AN ORAL AGREEMENT WAS MADE, IS IT VOID BECAUSE
OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS?
As stated in our Preliminary Statement, Plaintiffs have
no objection to the Trial Court's finding that there was an oral
modification of the Escrow Agreement. That avoids the issue of the
statute of limitations. We challenge the Trial Court's finding or
conclusion that the parties contemplated that when demand for
payment was made, it would commence a schedule of payments at
$10,000 per year. We have covered that in our Argument in Point I
of this Brief.
-7-

IV.

WAS A PAYMENT FOR CATTLE SOLD IN 1979 PROPERLY ALLOWED BY THE
COURT AS A PAYMENT ON THE CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF PROPERTY?
Appellees' Brief suggests that the finding was supported

by the evidence and they cite the finding and then in a footnote
refer to only a portion of the testimony of Max Fisher.

Their

Brief states that we have failed to marshal the evidence.

We

submit that all the evidence was marshalled in our original Brief
(see Pp. 20-22) and that the only testimony which supports the
finding is the bald assertion by Max and echoed by his wife that
the cattle were their cattle. All the documentary evidence and the
admissions of Joyce Fisher that the sale was not reported as their
sale to their accountant or on their income tax returns are
contrary to the finding.

The evidence has been marshalled and we

submit that the finding is "clearly erroneous" since no weight was
given to the evidence which was made concurrently with the transaction, all of which made the sale out to be a sale of the George
Fisher, Jr. cattle.

If the Court believes Max' and Joyce's

testimony now, they were income tax evaders in 1979.
V.

WAS THE REMEDY OF FORFEITURE AS SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANTS
INEQUITABLE UNDER THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT?
This matter was addressed in our original Brief at pages

22-24.

Whether forfeiture would be inequitable is a matter of

judgment.
Court

The Trial Judge was entitled to his judgment and this

is required

to substitute

its

judgment

as to whether

forfeiture would be inequitable and also as to what the alternative
should be if forfeiture would be inequitable. The Trial Judge did
not consider any balance of the equities. The Trial Court gave no
-8-

consideration

to the

fact that the Defendants

have been in

possession of this property for twenty years, have made their
living from the property, have paid their expenses including the
costs of improvements on the property and the construction of a new
home from production of the property, had the use of George
Fisher's cattle for at least five years, and when they borrowed
money to complete the home, they borrowed it against cattle and
equipment which had been paid for by proceeds of ranching and
farming on the property which is in dispute.

They raised cattle

worth a big sum, paid for with a check which bounced (R. 429-430).
There is no evidence of any substantial outside income or any
outside assets other than the $30,000 received under the Mapco
agreement and the $12,500 plus $1,000 per year under the Linmar
agreement, which
purchase.

Defendants

received

under

the

contract

to

There is no evidence that the price of $124,000 was

unreasonable or that the property today, including the home on it,
is

worth

substantially

more

than

it

would

be

without

the

"improvements."

The improvements made on the property were

presumably

because

made

they

would

make

the

property

more

productive, produce more income for the Defendants, and make the
property more desirable for them to retain.

These factors should

be considered by this Court before determining whether forfeiture
of the land at this juncture would be inequitable.
As pointed

out in our original Brief

(Pp. 42-43),

assuming that forfeiture would be inequitable, the usual remedy is
to give the buyers

additional
-9-

time to pay

the amount due.

Plaintiffs do not object to that so long as the payment is made now
rather than far into the future, long after the death of LaRue
Fisher and probably after the death of all the other parties to
this litigation.
The decision of the Trial Court (R. 249-258), although
confusing as to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, was never
analyzed or argued before the Court.
final (R. 273).

The Court ruled that it was

The Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the

Judgment requested a transcript so that the testimony could be
examined and compared with the findings and conclusions. This was
dated October 28 and refused on November 4 before the Defendants
had responded and without opportunity to discuss it with the Court
(R. 275). Plaintiffs filed documents showing amortization schedule
and the rate of inflation and how long would be involved if annual
payments only started with the decision of the Court, and there is
no evidence that the Court ever considered it.
Defendants in their Brief cite two Utah cases that
forfeiture is a harsh penalty and should be gingerly enforced, but
also noting that the parties may contract for such terms as they
can

agree

Construction
Park

City

upon.
Co.,
Utah

Moonlake

Elec.

Ass'n.

v.

Ultrasystems

767 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1988), and Russell
Corp.,

W.
v.

548 P.2d 889 (Utah 1976), (P. 32-33 of

Appellees' Brief).
These cases have no factual analogy to our case. Whether
forfeiture is appropriate is a judgment decision. If forfeiture is
inequitable, the usual relief in a land sale contract, as cited in
-10-

our original Brief (Pp. 42-43), is to give the purchaser some
additional time to complete the payments owing.

The Trial Court

has found the amount that is now owing and the purchasers have
already had quite a bit of time to marshal their assets and arrange
for payoff of the balance if it can be done.

If the property is

not worth the amount owing, there is no reason why it should not go
back to the sellers.
VI.

SHOULD THE COURT HAVE ALLOWED APPELLANTS' ATTORNEY FEES?
Defendants in their Brief simply request that the Court

award attorneys fees to the Defendants. The Trial Judge apparently
found that neither party had prevailed and so did not award
attorneys fees. Plaintiffs submit that they had no course open to
them except to bring the action as they did.

They have not been

denied relief but have been granted the relief which the Court
found to be equitable, and that should have been sufficient under
Soffe

v.

Ridd,

659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983), cited in our original

Brief at page 45.
CONCLUSION
It is plain that the Trial Judge made a painstaking
decision and having made his decision, used some of the evidence
leading to that decision as support.

Plaintiffs don't seriously

quarrel with the finding of an oral modification to give Defendants
more time and do not squirm under the finding that forfeiture would
be inequitable. The result of this should have been a holding that
the payment with interest is due and payable and that Defendant
should either come up with payment or give up the property.
-11-

The

implication of the decision that payments of $10,000 per year are
all that Plaintiffs are entitled to is completely unreasonable• If
the interest due does not bear interest, the payments would require
391/2 years of deflated money. If the interest which is owing should
be compounded at a niggardly 5%, the contract would never be paid
off. That result is grossly inequitable and the decision should be
reversed, awarding attorneys fees to the Plaintiffs.

RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL
This response will refer to certain of the issues raised
by Defendants as stated in the Brief of Cross-Appellants.
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs recognize that the Statement of Facts is of an
argumentative character and space does not permit refutation of a
number of statements which are stated as facts but which are
erroneous. For instance, on line 14, page 9, it is stated that the
Defendants were "liable for the mortgage on the home that is now
approximately $30f000f" when in fact the mortgage was on cattle and
equipment which were acquired by the Defendants with income from
the property itself.
APPELLEES II: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO THE MAJORITY
INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS UNDER THE ESCROW
WHEN PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PURSUE ACTION
SIX YEAR PERIOD.

APPLY THE
OF YEARLY
AGREEMENT
WITHIN THE

Defendants argue that the statute of limitations serves
a legitimate purpose in dealing with stale claims where not
explained by some actions of the parties or preserved for some good
reason.
-12-

Defendants cite four Utah cases upholding application of
the statute of limitations. Not one of these cases deals with the
sale of real property under a real estate contract which preserves
title in the seller until payments have been completed. Plaintiffs
addressed this question in their Memorandum in Support of their
Motion for Summary Judgment, citing the following cases and the
following authorities:

CarJberry v.

(Calif. Ct.App. 1956); Dickerson
1965); McKelvey
Ash v. Utah,

v. Rodriguez,

v. Brewster,

299 P.2d 966, 970
399 P.2d 407 (Idaho

134 P.2d 870 (Calif. Ct. App. 1943);

572 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977); Evans v. Johnson,

299, 19 S.E. 623; 51 Am.Jur.2d,
Am.Jur.2d,

Trentham,

39 W.Va.

Limitation of Actions, U 406; 77

Vendor and Purchaser, U 414; 54 C.J.S., Limitation of

Actions, 1111 208 and 210 (R. 38-42).
Defendants responded to this Memorandum with their own
Memorandum, which attempted to distinguish the cited cases from
Utah law, because the cases referred to "seisin" or "possession"
(R. 110-111).
In their further Memorandum on the Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiffs cited § 78-12-6, Utah Code Annotated

(1953) as

dealing with seisin or possession, and also Grayson

Roper

Finlinson,

v.

782 P.2d 467, 469 (Utah 1989), (R. 130).
The cases cited by Defendants in Appellees' Brief deal

only with promissory notes and other contracts having installment
payments and do not deal with any contracts for the sale of land
where title is retained in the seller.

-13-

The instant action is not

an action for installment payments but an action for forfeiture of
the land for failure to meet the requirements of the Escrow
Agreement.

Seisin exists in the Plaintiffs and the action is

within the statutory period, § 78-12-6, because the Plaintiff
sellers still hold title to the property.
If this Court rules that there was no oral modification
of

the

agreement, it should

also rule that

the

statute of

limitations does not bar this type of action and should then
consider whether a forfeiture as prayed for in the Complaint would
be inequitable and what is the alternative for the Defendants to
obtain title.
APPELLEES III: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO APPLY THE
EQUITABLE DOCTRINES OF WAIVER, ESTOPPEL, AND LACHES
IN THIS CASE WHEN GEORGE FISHER TOLD DEFENDANT NOT
TO MAKE THE YEARLY INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS AND
DEFENDANT ACTED IN RELIANCE UPON THESE REPRESENTATIONS FOR APPROXIMATELY 15 YEARS WITHOUT REPRISAL.
Defendants

consider

separately waiver, estoppel and

laches, and we shall do the same.
A.

Waiver
Defendants' Brief makes general statements about not

requiring prompt payment of the installments, but refers to no
evidence where "relinquishment" is addressed or is deducible.

On

page 17 the Brief states that George Fisher "commanded Max and
Joyce not to pay under the terms of the Escrow Agreement but to
reinvest the money into the property.

The word "commanded" does

not appear in any of the testimony and there is no evidence that
the amounts of the annual payments were invested in the property.

-14-

The only testimony concerning $10,000 invested was rejected by the
Court as not established.

(R. 253, LI. 7-10; 256, LI. 7-20)

Then at page 20 Defendants' Brief states that George
waived his rights for him and his wife "and his wife consented by
her inaction to that waiver." The Brief refers to no evidence that
the possibility of relinquishment was ever presented to LaRue
Fisher so that her inaction could be considered acquiescence.
The Brief cites only the case of Setter's,
Federal

Savings

of waiver.

and Loan,

Inc.

v.

Deseret

857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993), on the subject

That case says the law on waiver in Utah is very

confused, but does seem to say at page 940 that three elements are
necessary:
(1) An existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2)
knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to
relinquish the right.
There is no doubt that the Plaintiffs knew of the existence of the
right to payments, but the question of intent to relinquish is
completely absent.
The Court in its decision did not distinguish between
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and that is why Plaintiffs
did not regard it as a final decision until the Court flatly stated
that it was final.

But it appears that the Court made the

following statements, which should be considered as Findings, on
the issue of waiver and perhaps also on the issues of estoppel and
laches:
17. In 1988 or 1989, Max and Joyce were
contemplating building a new home. Max testified
that at that time he knew he was still
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obligated to make payments under the contract•
(R. 253, LI. 22-24)
Also, in 1979, Max maintains that he sold some
of his cattle and the proceeds went to George and
LaRue. This is a further indication that there was
no agreement to forgive debt or to treat payments
as gifts. All of this leads the Court to conclude
that no agreement was ever made nor did the seller
or buyer ever agree to forgive debts or to treat
payments as gifts. (R. 254, LI. 4-7)
The evidence indicates that the agreement
between the parties in 1975, that is the oral
agreement, was merely to delay payments rather than
to forgive payments. (R. 254, LI. 9-10)
She [LaRue] was certainly aware of all
conversations between Max and George.
She knew
that payments had been postponed and that monies
had been invested in the property. She did not
believe that these payments had been forgiven or
gifted. Under these circumstances, she also bound
by the agreement to postpone payments. (R. 255,
LI. 18-21)
20. As previously stated, Max and Joyce
continued to believe that they were obligated under
the contract. (R. 256, L. 5)
These appear to be Findings subject to the "clearly
erroneous" standard of review and Defendants and Appellees Brief
has marshalled no evidence and referred to no evidence of any
intention

to "relinquish" the payments.
B.

Estoppel.
It is not clear what defendants are contending for

under this heading. They cite two Utah cases, in the first one of
which estoppel was enforced and in the second one, the Court held
that there was no basis for estoppel.
v.

Concrete

Specialists,

Inc.,

In that latter case, Cesco

772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989), the

plaintiff had indicated that it would endeavor to relieve the
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defendant of payment and without abandoning its claim against the
defendant so that the Court held there was no basis for estoppel.
Likewise, in this case, there is no evidence of forgiveness of the
debt and the Court held specifically that the debt had not been
forgiven (R. 252, L. 8; 258, L. 22). The only question was when it
would be paid. George Fisher said he "did not then need the money"
(R. 251, L. 21), the contract payments were delayed and not
forgiven (R. 252, L. 8).

George told Max he would ask for the

payments later (R. 254, L. 2), leaving open the question of when
payments would be demanded and not whether.

Also, Defendants'

Brief under this heading says that "forfeiture" of the Defendants'
interest would be unjust (P. 30). Actually, Defendants' argument
on this point is a matter of equity and the form that equitable
relief should take.
Defendants do not argue the application of the statute of
frauds to the issue of estoppel.

Plaintiffs urged this upon the

Trial Court, arguing that even though George Fisher's actions would
form the basis for estoppel, that would not bind his joint tenant
unless efforts had been made by the buyers to learn whether the
other joint tenant acquiesced in the position of the one who was
doing the talking. In that regard we cited Coombs v. Ouzounian,
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Utah 2d 39, 42-43, 465 P.2d 356 (Utah 1970), and the Court ruled
that that case applied only where the modification of the agreement
dealt directly with title to the land rather than to a term of the
agreement.

We submit that that case, as well as the following

cases, are specific that the statute of frauds applies to any
-17-

material provision of the contract which is subject to the statute
of frauds, and the Coombs v. Ouzounian

case specifically says that

a person cannot bind the non-speaking joint tenant on the theory of
estoppel without going to that joint tenant and determining what
his or her attitude is.
(Utah 1986) and Zion's

See Allen
Properties

v. Kingdon,
v.

Holt,

723 P.2d 394, 396

538 P.2d 1319, 1322

(Utah 1975) discussed at page 37-38 of our opening Brief.

In this

case it is plain that LaRue Fisher's attitude was contrary to the
concessions that George Fisher was reportedly making.

The Court

found this at R. 253, L. 11; R. 254, L. 23; and R. 257, L. 25. If
Max had gone to his mother to learn her attitude, as to which he
was put on notice, he would have learned that she definitely wanted
payments to be made as they fell due.
If Max and Joyce Fisher had ever given any indication
that they intended to get the ranch property without paying for it
or intended to have title pass to them without paying for it, that
would have commanded an immediate and definite response certainly
from LaRue Fisher and probably from George Fisher.

Max and Joyce

were content to occupy the property, make their living from it
without ever having to pay anything, and now they apparently want
to continue that income-producing possession without paying for it.
Defendants should be subject to estoppel.
C.

Laches.
The only case cited by Defendants on this topic is

Plateau

Mining

v. Utah Division

of State

Lands,

802 P.2d 720 at 731

(Utah 1990), which case found there was no showing of laches but
-18-

said that it has two elements:

"(1) lack of diligence on the part

of the claimant and (2) an injury to the defendant because of the
lack of diligence." It is true that there was lack of diligence on
the part of both parties here. George Fisher permitted his son to
remain on the land and utilize it without insisting that the agreed
payments be made. Max and Joyce Fisher continued to enjoy the land
and the profits from it without ever indicating to Max's father
that they intended never to pay for the property. Plaintiff LaRue
Fisher was completely ignored in their dealings, although it was
known definitely to George and apparently known to Max that LaRue
Fisher was not in harmony.

There was no indication by George

Fisher that he did not intend to exact the payments ultimately and
no indication from Max Fisher that he did not intend to pay for the
property ultimately.

There was lack of diligence on both sides.

On the other hand, George and LaRue Fisher were deprived
of the benefit of their bargain, in that they did not receive the
money they were entitled to in return for delivering up possession
of the property. The father had difficulty handling the situation
and the mother was reluctant to push both her husband and her son
into a course of action which she thought was right.

The Trial

Judge recognized the problems of a family relationship in his
decision (see R. 253 11 16).
The Defendants make a statement about the policy of the
law to enforce actions within six years, citing 78-12-23, Utah Code
Annotated.

Plaintiffs submit that the applicable statute is

78-12-5, 5.2 and 6, Utah Code Annotated,
-19-

which provides that an

action can be commenced if there has been seisin or possession of
the property within seven years. This action is not to collect the
installment payments but to enforce the forfeiture provisions of
the contract for nonperformance.

Whether forfeiture would be

inequitable is a decision which lies within the discretion of this
Court in reviewing the decision of the Trial Judge.

If the land

has not increased in value, Defendants cannot complain about
turning it over after the productive use of it for twenty years.
If it has become more valuable, Defendants can either sell the land
and keep the profit or borrow against the land and pay off the
Plaintiffs.

The position of Plaintiffs is that after waiting

twenty years with either one payment or no payments, depending on
how the Court rules on the sale of cattle in 1979, but facing the
prospect of payments at reduced dollars for either 391/2 years or
forever, it is grossly inequitable. Since the interest has accrued
and is now due, there appears to be no reason for not giving
interest on the amount of interest that has accrued to date.
Defendants appeal for equitable treatment.

The Trial

Court thought forfeiture was inequitable and gave the Defendants
forever to pay out on deflated dollars.

It is true that George

Fisher was reluctant to quarrel with his oldest son, but he never
forgave the debt and recognized that sooner or later Max must pay
or forfeit. George isn't here to testify. The other parent, LaRue
Fisher, didn't want an open quarrel with her husband, but she and
the rest of the family now ask for performance.

The Defendants

have lived off the property, have received $45,000 in additional
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cash, have taken advantage of the family situation and now want the
whole property

for

$47,717.96.

There

is no equity

in the

Defendants' cross-appeal.
APPELLEES V:

A.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHALLED THE
EVIDENCE TO SHOW CLEAR ERROR ON THE FACTUAL ISSUES
THEY WISH TO APPEAL.
LaRue Fisher
Husband.

is

Bound

by

the Actions

of Her

This subject was addressed under our Point II with
the evidence marshalled at pages 15-18 and covered in our Argument
at pages 34-36. The evidence is plain that LaRue Fisher at no time
agreed to postponement of the payments in any form, but the
evidence is equally plain that her position always was that the
payments should be made as they fell due.
contained in the marshalled evidence.

Her own attitude is

The fact that she did not

make an independent demand against the Defendants is explained as
involving a disagreement with her husband, which family situation
needs to be taken into account in this proceeding.

The holding

that LaRue Fisher was bound by the actions of her husband, we
submit, is a conclusion of law and this Court owes no deference to
the conclusion of the Trial Court.
B.

The Proceeds of the Cattle Sale in 1979 Were
Properly Credited to an Escrow Payment.
We don't understand the statement of Appellees that

we failed to marshal the evidence on this point. Our Brief at page
4 states that this finding is entitled to great deference and the
evidence is marshalled at pages 20-22 of our Brief. It is admitted
that Max and Joyce testified that the cattle sold were their cattle
-21-

and LaRue Fisher testified that the cattle sold belonged to her and
her husband.

The documentary evidence and the treatment of the

cattle sale, so far as accounting and income taxes were concerned,
all showed that the sale was treated in 1979 by all parties as the
sale of the George Fisher cattle.

At that time there was no

dispute existing as to whose cattle were sold.

The evidence at

that time all showed that the cattle were the George Fisher cattle.
Our argument is that to accept the testimony of Max and Joyce
Fisher against the strong evidence as of the time of the sale shows
an error in the judgment of the Trial Court. The treatment of the
cattle sale in 1979 was false by Max and Joyce Fisher if, in fact,
the cattle were theirs because they wanted to avoid income tax. We
submit the documentary evidence, the evidence at the time of the
sale, the testimony of LaRue Fisher, and the motives of Max and
Joyce Fisher combined to be sufficient to overturn the conclusion
of the Trial Judge that the cattle belonged to the Defendants.
APPELLEES VI:

IN FINDING THAT THE CONTRACT HAD BEEN MODIFIED, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT INTEREST
CONTINUED TO ACCRUE ON THE CONTRACT PRINCIPLE WHEN
ALL THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT CONTINUED ACCRUAL
WAS NEVER CONTEMPLATED BY THE PARTIES, GEORGE
FISHER DID NOT EXPECT INTEREST TO ACCRUE AND THE
PAYMENTS WERE WAIVED BY BOTH GEORGE AND LARUE
FISHER.

The Appellees state two subheads under this point:

A.

No evidence supports Trial Court's factual finding that the parties
agreed to pay interest, and B.

George Fisher waived continued

accrual of interest.

-22-

There is no doubt as to the agreement to pay interest.
This was contained in the Escrow Agreement, which is Exhibit P-l,
which provides on page 1 dealing with the installment payments:
Said payments, which include interest at the rate
of five percent (5%) per annum, will be applied
first to interest and then to principal.
It is true that in the conversations between Max and George, there
was no agreement that interest would be paid, as that was covered
by the Escrow Agreement.

The Trial Court made no finding that

interest was not waived and made no finding that interest was
accruing. This was assumed and the Court's only statement was that
there was no gift of the interest (R. 256, LI. 12-14).

The only

testimony on interest was that of Mr. Oman at R. 526, where LaRue
Fisher stated, in the absence of Max and Joyce, that the Defendants
should make the payments plus interest on the payments and George
Fisher reportedly said, "I don't think we should charge interest on
it."

This is certainly no waiver of interest. It is the contrary

so far as LaRue Fisher is concerned. Mr. Oman testified that that
conversation was communicated to Max Fisher (R. 530, L. 3).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs submit that this is an action for forfeiture
for nonpayment of the contract and the only applicable statute of
limitations is 78-12-6 (or 5 and 5.2), Utah Code Annotated.

If

that is correct, the entire balance, including interest, must have
been paid to avoid the forfeiture under the Escrow Agreement.
Plaintiffs submit that the Court overlooked the equities
in favor of Plaintiffs and the vast income Defendants have had from
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the land, without putting any outside assets into it, in holding
that forfeiture would be inequitable•

The Defendants have made

their living from the land and from that living have raised cattle,
made improvements, replaced the home, received $30,000 from Mapco,
$19,500 from Linmar, $24,980 for cattle in 1979, received a big but
bogus check for cattle in 1981 (R. 429-430), always had money in
the bank, and paid the Sellers either nothing or the proceeds from
a few of the cattle raised on the farm.

Plaintiffs have received

nothing or almost nothing and yet the Trial Court found forfeiture
to be inequitable.

That is a conclusion this Court must review,

without deference.
And only then must the Court consider whether a payoff
schedule starting 20 years late and continuing for either 391/2 years
or into perpetuity, depending on whether interest
delinquent interest, is reasonable.

is allowed on

There is no evidence that

George Fisher and Max Fisher contemplated this result and the only
evidence on the subject is that George contemplated that Max would
either pay up or forfeit the property.
The issues of the cattle payment in 1979 and attorney's
fees are not abandoned.
Defendants have cross-appealed from a decision which
ignored

the equities

forfeiture.

in favor of the Plaintiffs

in denying

They have lived off the property for twenty years,

claiming one challenged payment from cattle raised on the property,
with provision to start paying with cheap dollars at the old rate,
which will take forever, with another year's possession during
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appeal time, with no award of attorney fees, and they have crossappealed!

They have already upset the whole family and now they

want the family farm and ranch for a measly $47,717.96.
This Court should reverse the Trial Court by holding that
payments plus
Agreement

interest are in default

forfeiture

is

appropriate.

and under
This

the Escrow

would

not

be

inequitable. If this Court holds forfeiture to be inequitable, it
should give Defendants a reasonable time to pay or else. The Trial
Court

found

the

notice

to

be

sufficient.

The

statute of

limitations does not bar the action and Defendants show no basis
for waiver, estoppel or laches. Plaintiffs should have attorney's
fees in the Trial Court and in this Court.
DATED this 21st day of April, 1995.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, a P.C.

Richard L. Bird, Jr

Lon Rodney Kump
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2988
Telephone: (801) 328-8987
Attorneys for Appellants and
Cross-Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES was served on the DefendantsAppellees this 21st day of April, 1995, by mailing two (2) true and
correct copies thereof via United States Mail with postage prepaid
thereon to Lohra L. Miller, Esquire, LOHRA L. MILLER & ASSOCIATES,
attorney for Defendants/Appellees, at P. 0. Box 325, West Jordan,
Utah 84084-0325.
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